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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Don Edward Collom appeals from his conviction for lewd conduct with a 
child. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Collom with one count of lewd conduct with a child 
under the age of 16 for having oral-genital contact with a 15-year-old boy.  (R., 
pp. 59-60.)  The case proceeded to jury trial.  (R., pp. 252-61.)   
Prior to the start of presentation of evidence, Collom moved to exclude the 
victim’s mother, Monica Winder, from the courtroom because she was a witness.  
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 256, L. 19 – p. 257, L. 10.)  The state responded that, because 
the victim was a minor, immediate family members such as parents were 
considered victims, and requested that the mother be allowed to be present at 
the trial as the family representative.  (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 258, L. 6 – p. 259, L. 6.)  
Collom’s trial attorney argued that the victim was old enough to attend trial and 
therefore a family representative was unnecessary, and alternatively asked that 
the court designate the victim’s father as the family representative.  (Trial Tr., vol. 
I, p. 259, Ls. 9-18.)  After further colloquy with counsel, the district court allowed 
the mother to be present in the courtroom as the family representative.  (Trial Tr., 
vol. I, p. 259, L. 19 – p. 263, L. 25.) 
At the conclusion of the trial the jury found Collom guilty.  (R., p. 262.) 
 Shortly after the verdict, Collom moved for a new trial.  (R., p. 266.)  One 




defense witness E.O. had been intimidated by Monica Winder’s presence in the 
courtroom.  (R., pp. 275-82.)  Other grounds asserted were claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument that had not been objected to at 
trial.  (R., pp. 282-88.)   The district court denied the motion because it failed to 
articulate one of the statutory grounds for granting a new trial.  (R., pp. 298-303.)   
The district court entered judgment, imposing a sentence of 10 years with 
three years determinate.  (R., pp. 317-20.)  Collom timely appealed from the 






 Collom states the issues on appeal as: 
A. The trial court erred in refusing to grant Defendant’s motion 
to exclude a person who intimidated a witness from the 
courtroom, while the intimidated witness testified. 
 
B. The trial court failed to consider the constitutional rights of 
Defendant, allowing the State to select a designee to be in 
the courtroom, over Defendant’s objection, and failing to 
analyze the need for a designee under Idaho Code § 19-
5306(3). 
 
C. The State committed prosecutorial misconduct when the 
Prosecutor disparaged Defense Counsel and Defense 
Counsel’s credibility in trial and during closing arguments.  
 
D. The State committed prosecutorial misconduct when the 
Prosecutor appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of 
the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics by instructing 
the jury to place themselves in the position of the victim. 
 
E. The cumulative errors in the trial were of such magnitude 
they denied the Defendant his constitutional right to a fair 
trial. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Collom failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when 
it denied his pre-trial motion to exclude witnesses under I.R.E. 615 both 
because the witness was the family representative of the victim and 
because Collom failed to show the possibility of relevant prejudice? 
 
2. Has Collom, who does not challenge the district court’s holding that his 
motion was not based on a statutory ground, failed to show error in the 
denial of his motion for a new trial? 
 
3. Has Collom failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s closing 
arguments? 
 







Collom Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The Partial Denial Of His Pre-Trial 




 The district court denied Collom’s motion to exclude witnesses as 
regarding witness Monica Winder, the child victim’s mother.  (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 
256, L. 19 – p. 263, L. 25.)  On appeal Collom asserts that the victim’s mother 
was improperly allowed to remain under the victim’s rights statute.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 9-10.)  Review of the applicable law, however, shows no abuse of 
discretion.  First, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Monica 
Winder could remain as the representative of the family under the victim’s rights 
statute.  Second, Collom has never claimed or demonstrated a legal ground for 
exclusion under I.R.E. 615. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Both the decision of whether to grant or deny a request for witness 
exclusion under I.R.E. 615 and the appropriate remedy for a breach of any such 
order are discretionary decisions by the trial court.  State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 
580, 589, 199 P.3d 155, 164 (Ct. App. 2008).  
 
C. Collom Has Shown No Error In The District Court’s Ruling Under I.R.E. 
615 
 
 Upon request or upon its own initiative “the court may order witnesses 
excluded so they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.”  I.R.E. 615(a).  




present.  Id.  Furthermore, “the trial court ordinarily should not exclude witnesses 
without a demonstration of probable prejudice.”  Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 589, 
199 P.3d at 164.  Refusal to order a mistrial for disobedience of an exclusionary 
order “will not justify reversal on appeal absent a showing of prejudice sufficient 
to constitute an abuse of discretion.”  Id.  The prejudice at issue under I.R.E. 615 
is the “possibility of witnesses shaping their testimony to conform to or rebut the 
prior testimony of other witnesses.”  Id.    
Application of these legal standards shows no error by the trial court, first 
because the witness at issue was a victim and therefore exempt from the 
exclusionary provisions of I.R.E. 615 and, second, because there was no 
showing of potential (or actual) prejudice arising from her presence in the 
courtroom. 
 First, the witness was a victim by law and therefore exempt from exclusion 
under I.R.E. 615.  A “crime victim, as defined by statute” has the right to “be 
present at all criminal justice proceedings.”  Idaho Const., Art. I, § 22.  The 
statutory definition of crime victim includes “immediate families of victims of such 
youthful age or incapacity as precludes them from exercising these rights 
personally.”  I.C. § 19-5306(3).  Furthermore, even though inability of the victim 
to exercise the right to be present personally renders all immediate family 
members “victims,” the statute gives the court discretion to “designate a 
representative from the immediate family to exercise these rights on behalf of a 
… minor victim.”  Id.  The prosecutor represented that the victim, a minor, would 




he was very emotional about the proceedings.  (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 261, L. 23 – p. 
262, L. 12; p. 263, Ls. 11-15.)  The district court allowed the mother to remain in 
the courtroom during the trial as the family representative, and thus the victim.  
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 263, Ls. 16-25.1)   
 On appeal Collom initially points out that before immediate family 
members could be considered victims in this case, the court must “determine 
whether or not the alleged victim is of ‘such youthful age or incapacity as [to] 
preclude them from exercising [his] rights personally.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  
However, he presents no argument claiming, much less establishing, that the 
district court erred in this determination. 
 Collom next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
designating the mother, as opposed to the father, as the family representative.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.)  The only reason he puts forth in support of that 
assertion, however, is that the “State did not present any reason why the alleged 
victim’s father, Marshall Winder, could not have been in the courtroom during the 
testimony of EO, instead of Monica Winder, as requested by the defendant.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.2)  Collom fails to comprehend that it is his burden of 
                                            
1 Because the parties and the district court spent considerable time on the 
question of whether the mother was a “victim” as defined by the statute (Trial Tr., 
vol. I, p. 256, L. 9 – p. 263, L. 25), Collom’s claim that “[n]o inquiry was made to 
determine whether Monica Winder was a victim” (Appellant’s brief, p. 2) is false. 
 
2 Appellate counsel’s claim that the defense “requested” that the victim’s mother 
not be “in the courtroom during the testimony of EO” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9; see 
also p. 2) is at best misleading.  Although the defense moved to exclude 
witnesses prior to trial, including Monica Winder, at no time did the defense relate 
that specifically to E.O.  (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 256, L. 24 – p. 257, L. 10.)  The 




establishing an abuse of discretion.  The district court concluded there was no 
sufficient reason for rejecting the family’s choice of representative, and exercised 
its discretion in allowing the family’s chosen representative to be present.  (Trial 
Tr., vol. I, p. 262, L. 18 – p. 263, L. 25.)  Although the court in its discretion could 
have designated the father instead of the mother does not make the appointment 
of the mother beyond the discretion of the court.  Because Collom has failed to 
present any legal basis for why appointment of the mother was outside the 
boundaries of the court’s discretion, he has failed to show an abuse of that 
discretion. 
 He has also failed to show an abuse of discretion because he never, 
before the trial court or on appeal, claimed or established any relevant prejudice.  
As stated above, “the trial court ordinarily should not exclude witnesses without a 
demonstration of probable prejudice” and the prejudice at issue is the “possibility 
of witnesses shaping their testimony to conform to or rebut the prior testimony of 
other witnesses.”  Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 589, 199 P.3d at 164.  Thus, to show 
an abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude a potential witness the appellant 
                                                                                                                                  
during E.O.’s testimony.  (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 504, L. 1 – p. 511, L. 1.)  Even if the 
pretrial motion to exclude had been granted, Ms. Winder would have been 
allowed in the courtroom when E.O. testified.  Ms. Winder testified in the state’s 
case-in-chief.  (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 388, L. 13 – p. 414, L. 8.)  She was re-called 
and testified for the defense prior to E.O. testifying.  (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 495, L. 2 
– p. 499, L. 19 (Monica Winder testified as defense witness); p. 511, Ls. 5-7 
(E.O. called and sworn as witness).)  Because her testimony was completed 
before E.O. testified, even granting the pretrial motion excluding witnesses would 
not have prevented her from sitting in the courtroom after having given her 
testimony.   Any claim that the defense raised any objection to Ms. Winder being 
in the courtroom while E.O. testified based on the pre-trial contact between the 




must show the “possibility of witnesses shaping their testimony to conform to or 
rebut the prior testimony of other witnesses.”  Id.  Monica Winder testified after 
the victim, J.W., in the state’s case-in-chief, and again when called by the 
defense, after several defense witnesses.  (See Trial Tr., vol. I, pp. 5-6.)  Collom 
has not argued that there was any genuine risk that Monica Winder shaped her 
testimony to conform to the victim’s testimony because she was in the courtroom 
when he testified, and of course the defense had control over the order in which 
it called its own witnesses, suggesting it was not concerned that Monica Winder 
would shape her testimony because of hearing the testimony of the preceding 
defense witnesses.  In short, Collom has utterly failed to address the only legal 
basis upon which he may claim an abuse of discretion. 
 Finally, for similar reasons any error in not excluding Monica Winder from 
the courtroom except when she testified was harmless.  Idaho Criminal Rule 52 
provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  I.C.R. 52.  “To establish harmless error, 
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did 
not contribute to the verdict obtained.”  State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 
P.3d 806, 814 (2014). 
Only one witness for the state preceded Monica’s testimony, the victim.  
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 5.)  The victim was Monica’s son, and he resided in her home.  
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 389, Ls. 3-23.)  Collom’s counsel had the opportunity to 
explore through cross-examination Monica’s relationship with her son and 




testimony because she was present when her son testified, is so small as to be 
non-existent.  If there had been any shaping of testimony, such had already 
occurred before trial and was subject to cross-examination.  Any abuse of 
discretion in allowing Monica Winder to be in the courtroom when the victim 
testified was, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless.  
In addition, when Monica Winder was called as a defense witness she 
was questioned about her confront telephone call with Collom.  (Trial Tr., vol. II, 
p. 495, L. 2 – p. 498, L. 23.)  This was a topic not covered with any other witness.  
(See, generally, Trial Tr.)  Because there was no other testimony about the topic, 
by definition her presence in the courtroom could not have caused her to alter 
her testimony.  Any error was therefore harmless. 
 Rule 615, which allows the court to excuse witnesses, excludes victims 
from its scope.  Collom has failed to show that the trial court erred when it 
concluded that Monica Winder, the mother of the victim, was a “victim” pursuant 
to the statute based on her son’s age and emotional state during trial.  In 
addition, a court abuses its discretion in refusing to exclude witnesses only where 
there is a showing of prejudice arising from the possibility of witnesses shaping 
their testimony to conform to or rebut the prior testimony of other witnesses.  
Collom has never claimed, much less shown, such prejudice.  He has, for both 
these reasons, failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling 










 Collom moved for a new trial asserting, among other grounds, that 
defense witness E.O. had been intimidated by Monica Winder’s presence in the 
courtroom.  (R., pp. 266, 275-82.)  The district court denied the motion on the 
grounds that it failed to articulate a statutorily allowed basis for granting a new 
trial.  (R., pp. 298-303.)  On appeal Collom asserts that the district court erred, 
but fails to even address the basis for the district court’s holding.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 6-10.) 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 674, 931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997); 
State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 819, 54 P.3d 460, 462 (Ct. App. 2002).  “The trial 
judge does not abuse his or her discretion unless a new trial is granted for a 
reason that is not delineated in the code or unless the decision to grant or deny a 
new trial is manifestly contrary to the interest of justice.”  State v. Davis, 127 
Idaho 62, 65, 896 P.2d 970, 973 (1995).   
 
C. The District Court’s Determination That Collom Did Not Allege A Statutory 
Ground For A New Trial Is Uncontested On Appeal 
 
 The only grounds for granting a new trial are found in I.C. § 19-2406.  
State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 675, 931 P.2d 1191, 1193 (1997).  The Idaho 




of justice.”  I.C.R. 34.  “Rule 34 does not create additional grounds for granting a 
new trial but, rather, provides the standard for determining whether a new trial 
should be granted when one or more of the statutory bases are present.”  Howell, 
137 Idaho at 819, 54 P.3d at 462.  Therefore, I.C. § 19-2406 “limits the instances 
in which the trial court’s discretion may be exercised.”  Cantu, 129 Idaho at 675, 
931 P.2d at 1193 (trial court abused discretion by granting new trial on grounds 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is not ground provided by I.C. § 19-
2406).  See also State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 83, 86, 878 P.2d 782, 785 (1994). 
 The district court concluded that in-court witness intimidation claims are 
not grounds under the statute to move for a new trial.  (R., pp. 298-303.)  Collom 
does not claim that his witness intimidation claim is within the scope of the 
statute.  (See Appellant’s brief.)  Because Collom has failed to even articulate a 
theory of error, he has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the denial of the 
motion for a new trial.  See State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 
1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998) (appellate court will affirm trial court on 
unchallenged basis for ruling); State v. Bjorkland, 126 Idaho 656, 659, 889 P.2d 
90, 93 (Ct. App. 1994) (orders by trial court presumed correct “absent a clear 
showing by the appellant of error”). 
 
III. 





 During closing argument, the prosecutor compared the defense strategy to 




dazzle” to divert the jury from the truth.  (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 566, L. 4 – p. 567, L. 
17.)  The defense did not object to these arguments.  (Id.)  In discussing the 
testimony of witness E.O. the prosecutor mentioned that “she had to leave a test 
at school to come over here.”  (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 564, Ls. 16-20.)  Again, 
defense counsel did not object.  (Id.)  In addition, and again without objection, the 
prosecutor discussed testimony regarding whether the victim was a “bad 
employee,” stating that even if he was that did not give anyone the right to 
victimize him.  (Trial Tr., p. 559, Ls. 4-14.) 
 On appeal, Collom asserts that the prosecutor’s arguments amount to 
fundamental error, but fails to even apply the relevant fundamental error 
standard.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.)  Analysis of Collom’s claim shows it fails 
on every prong of the fundamental error test. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.”  State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009).  If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, 
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing 
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental 





C. Collom Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s 
Closing Arguments 
 
Claims of error not preserved by timely objection are reviewed using a 
three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  Application of this test shows no 
fundamental error. 
 First, Collom has failed to show that the prosecutor’s arguments 
constituted constitutional error.  It is improper to disparage defense counsel.  
State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19, 189 P.3d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 2008).  However, 
comments that characterize defense arguments and theories, but are not 
directed at defense counsel, are not improper.  State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 
189, 254 P.3d 77, 90 (Ct. App. 2011).  Thus, arguing that defense arguments are 
“red herrings and smoke and mirrors” is not improper.  Id. at 188-89, 254 P.3d at 
89-90.  The prosecutor’s arguments comparing defense evidence to an 
obscuring ink cloud or “razzle-dazzle” diverting from the truth was not improper.  
 Likewise, mentioning that E.O. had to leave a test to come to court was 
not improper, much less constitutional error.  Defense counsel had previously 
represented to the court, in the presence of the jury, that E.O had been taken 




Collom’s claimed fundamental error looks more like a stipulation than an 
improper argument.   
Finally, the prosecutor’s argument about whether the victim was a “bad 
employee” was merely a discussion of the evidence, and the prosecutor’s main 
point was that it really did not matter because it is just as illegal to victimize bad 
employees as good ones.  This was not a constitutionally prohibited argument.  
State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 626, 262 P.3d 266, 269 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(prosecutor “entitled to discuss fully … the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom”).  None of the arguments by the prosecutor have been shown 
to be objectionable, much less constitutional error. 
 Even if the arguments were debatably objectionable, Collom has not 
shown that it rises to the level of a constitutionally objectionable argument.  Not 
all claims that an argument is improper rise to the level of asserting a 
constitutional violation.  State v. Beeks, 159 Idaho 223, ___, 358 P.3d 784, 791 
(Ct. App. 2015) (merely claiming the error implicates due process does not make 
the error of constitutional dimension).  Collom has failed to show that any 
allegedly erroneous closing argument rose to the level of being barred by the 
constitution. 
Moreover, the record shows that counsel made a tactical decision to not 
object, which disqualifies the argument that the error was fundamental under the 
second prong of that test.  In the defense closing argument counsel addressed 
the “ink” and “razzle-dazzle” arguments specifically.  (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 579, L. 




arguments through argument rather than objection, Collom cannot for the first 
time on appeal claim fundamental error.   
Likewise, the prosecutor’s mention that witness E.O. had come directly 
from being in a test was not objectionable because defense counsel made the 
same representation to the court in the presence of the jury.  Finally, it was 
eminently reasonable for trial counsel to express no objection to the prosecutor’s 
discussion of whether the evidence established the victim was a “bad employee,” 
especially where that point was secondary to the prosecutor’s primary line of 
argument regarding that evidence.  Nothing in this record indicates that defense 
counsel did not affirmatively choose to not object, because reasons to not object 
are plain in the record. 
 Finally, Collom has failed to show prejudice.  Although long on hyperbole 
and wild extrapolation of what meaning the jury would have gleaned from the 
“ink” and “razzle-dazzle” arguments, Collom’s argument is short on references to 
the record or analysis of why the argument was actually prejudicial or why 
defense counsel’s counter-argument was ineffective.  He merely engages in wild 
extrapolation of the worst possible reading of the prosecutor’s argument rather 
than addressing what the prosecutor actually said.  It is well established that “a 
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to 
have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy 
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging 
interpretations.”  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).  The 




attention diverting “razzle-dazzle” than substantive and weighty was not improper 
or prejudicial unless given a much more dark and sinister meaning than is 
allowed by this general principle. 
 Likewise, the mention that E.O. was taken away from a test cannot be 
deemed prejudicial in the face of the record showing that the jury was already 
aware of that fact because Collom’s trial counsel represented the same thing in 
open court. 
 Finally, the argument that the victim “wasn’t a bad employee” came with 
the caveat that he “wasn’t a very good employee” and was part of the broader 
argument that whether he was a bad employee does not bear much probative 
value as to whether he was sexually touched by Collom.  (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 559, 
Ls. 4-14.)  There is no reason to believe this argument unfairly prejudiced 
Collom. 
 Collom bears the burden of showing constitutional error; that the error is 
plain on the record and not the result of a tactical decision to not object; and that 
the error “affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 
226, 245 P.3d at 978.  He has failed to meet this burden as to any of the three 
prongs of the fundamental error standard. 
 
IV. 
Collom Has Failed To Show The Cumulative Error Standard Applies 
 
 Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. 




to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.  
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, 
cumulative error analysis does not include errors not objected to unless those 
errors are found to be fundamental.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982.  
As set forth above, Collom has failed to show error or fundamental error.  There 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
judgment of conviction. 
 DATED this 8th day of April, 2016. 
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